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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 15/03/2004

Accident number: 269

Accident time: 10:20

Accident Date: 05/06/2000

Where it occurred: Petrol refinery, Prizren
district. MNB(S)
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?)

Country: Kosovo
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: 12/06/2000

ID original source: KC/MD/JF

Name of source: KMACC

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: Fuze

Ground condition: grass/grazing area
rocks/stones

Date record created: 18/02/2004

Date last modified: 15/03/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude: 47° 21' 88"

Latitude: 46° 83' 09"
Coordinates fixed by: GPS

Alt. coord. system:
Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: KFOR Misc

Map series: UTM/WGS 84

Map edition: 8

Map sheet: 19 & 20

Map name: 1:50,000

Accident Notes
inadequate training (?)
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?)
inadequate communications (?)

Accident report
A Mine Accident Report was prepared for the country MACC and made available in August
2000. The following summarises its content.
The victim has nine months experience working as a Battle Area Clearance team member.
The deminers were working at a petrol refinery that had been "a NATO target during the
bombing campaign" and "cluster strikes" had been recorded. "Other clearance agencies and
KFOR [had] previously conducted clearance and demolition on [the] site". The weather on the
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day was clear and sunny with the temperature above 25 degrees C. The site was last visited
by MACC QA five days before the accident.
The communications system in place was not working well on the day of the accident. As a
result the demining group's HQ was not told of the accident for seven hours and the MACC
was not informed until the following day.
At 10:20 The victim was using a "Schonstedt GA 72-cd Locator in his "clearance area" and
got a signal. He moved the grass from the area and "noticed a silver coloured metallic object
visible on the surface". He was moving a stone to investigate this "suspected part of a BLU
97" when at 10:20 it detonated. He suffered injury to the index finger of his right hand. He was
wearing his PPE according to SOPs. [The PPE was not described or photographed but would
have included a visor and flak-jacket as required in that theatre.]
Work at the site was halted. The site medic gave first aid within three minutes of the accident.
The victim walked from the accident site. Despite the apparently minor nature of the injury,
the Team Leader decided that the victim should be checked in hospital. The victim was
"stabilised" and taken to the Argentine KFOR hospital, arriving 40 minutes after the accident.
On arrival at the hospital the victim's hand was x-rayed. It was decided that there were no
fractures and that no stitches were needed. "His cut was cleaned and dressed", antibiotics
were prescribed and he was told to return two days later to the outpatients’ department to
have it checked.
The investigators decided that the device involved was "most likely the detonator from a BLU97 previously destroyed".

Conclusion
The investigators concluded that if the victim had more experience he might have been more
cautious "before removing stones", but that the accident was unavoidable.

Recommendations
The investigators recommended that the demining group carry out a CASEVAC exercise and
that the MACC should be informed of all accidents no matter how minor within two hours (as
required in the MACC Technical Standards).

Victim Report
Victim number: 343

Name: Name removed

Age: 19

Gender: Male

Status: deminer

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 40 minutes

Protection issued: Not recorded

Protection used: not recorded

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Hand
COMMENT
See medical report.
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Medical report
This unsigned report is based on the statements of the Medic, BAC Searchers and the Victim.
At the time of the accident,(approx. 10.20) There were one fully equipped ambulance with a
driver and one Medic at the resting area.
When they heard the explosion and the whistles they immediately went to the place of the
accident.
They arrived at the place of the accident in 2 minutes. The victim was standing up in safe
area and had already been taken care of by [a deminer] who is also a medic.
The victim had sustained a laceration to his right forefinger, about 3cm long, and he was
bleeding, this was only a minor injury and he was feeling OK.
The medic examined him and no other injury was found.
The finger was cleaned and bandaged and the victim was placed in the ambulance.
After contacting the [demining group] office in Gjakova, the victim was transported to KFOR
hospital in Gjakova where he arrived at 10.50
At the hospital he was examined, x-rayed and his wound cleaned and dressed. No other
treatment was required and there was no need to stay at the hospital.
The medic filled in the Emergency journal and they all went to the [demining group] office for
debriefing.
Conclusions
The medical treatment was accurate according to the type of injury.
From the time of the accident till the time of arrival at the hospital was only 30 minutes.
The CASEVAC was performed to SOPs

Analysis
This accident could be classed as a “Missed-mine accident” because the area had been
cleared before and it seems likely that the device involved had been thrown out of a previous
(inadequate) detonation. The poor quality of the previous clearance had been recognised,
which explains why it was being cleared again. However, given that the area was being
recleared and the accident occurred during excavation, it is classed as an “Excavation
accident”.
The primary cause of this accident is listed as "Unavoidable" because it seems that the victim
was working as directed when the accident occurred. His failure to recognise the device that
he picked up leads to the secondary cause being listed as “Inadequate training”. This failing
was recognised by the demining group management – see Related papers.
The fact that the area had been cleared at least once previously lends weight to the view that
the device involved was a remnant of a previous incomplete destruction. But whether the part
was from a BLU-97 is not at all clear.
The accident report demonstrates an unusually thorough and critical approach to accident
investigation. The Mine Action Co-ordination Centre that carried out the investigation was not
engaged in demining, and this may (in part) explain the unusually objective nature of their
investigations.

Related papers
An investigation report by the Operations Manager of the demining group recorded that
communications between himself and the accident site were successful and that he was
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informed of the accident at 10:35 on the day it occurred. His attempt to "stand down" his
operatives was complicated by an inability to contact them all, and his inability to reach his
group's HQ meant that they were not informed until 17:15.
The Operations Manager and Team Leader examined the accident site and could find no
evidence of "disturbed ground" or any parts of the device. This was taken as evidence that
the device was a "kick-out" from a previous demolition at the site. The victim's PPE was intact
with no evidence of fragment impact or damage.
The operations Manager decided to increase training on component parts of sub-munitions.
He explained that the "broken" communications meant that he did not want to risk being
misunderstood and provoking unnecessary activity by trying to report the minor accident
sooner.
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